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Abstract 
 When do children, adolescents, and adults decide to punish fairness violations? Two 
studies with 9-year-old children, 13-year-old adolescents, and adults investigated whether the 
link between unfairness and punishment was mediated by negative emotional reactions 
(measured through galvanic skin responses and emotion ratings).  Study 1 (N = 117) 
examined this question in the context of second-party punishment, where the punisher is a 
direct victim of the violation.  Study 2 (N = 119) assessed third-party punishment, where the 
punisher is an observer, unaffected by the violation. In each study, participants were 
presented with seven distributions of points between a proposer and receiver which differed 
in how fairly the points were allocated between proposer and receiver. Participants had to 
decide whether to punish these distributions. While the unfairness of the distribution strongly 
influenced second- and third-party punishment in all age groups, the mediating role of 
emotional appraisals (i.e., galvanic skin responses vs. emotion ratings) depended on whether 
or not the punisher was personally affected by the violation (i.e., second- vs. third-party 
punishment) and age. These findings suggest that negative emotions primarily motivate 
costly punishment when the punisher is affected by the violation or when an unaffected third-
party punisher takes the perspective of the victim of a violation, an ability that develops 
between childhood and adolescence.  
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Introduction 
People’s interpersonal behavior is regulated by social and moral norms, and violations of 
these norms are often met with punishment. According to behaviorist, economic, and 
evolutionary theories, (the threat of) punishment can establish and maintain cooperation and 
social and moral norms in a population (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Jensen, 2010). But when do 
people decide to punish norm violations? Focusing on the violation of distributive fairness 
norms (e.g., norms prescribing one to distribute outcomes equally), we assess the impact of 
the unfairness of the violation and punishers’ emotional reactions to the violation. Such 
reactions may be contingent on whether the punisher is the direct victim of a fairness 
violation (second-party punishment) or an unaffected observer of the transgression (third-
party punishment; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). Importantly, they may also be contingent on 
age. Adopting a developmental perspective, we investigated when in development people 
engage in second- and third-party punishment and assessed developmental differences in why 
people punish. This contributes to the understanding of how mechanisms supporting the 
emergence and maintenance of moral behavior develop in human ontogeny. 
Two procedures have been developed in experimental economics to study second- 
and third-party punishment. The one-shot ultimatum game (UG) assesses second-party 
punishment of unfairness (Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982): Two anonymous 
interaction partners negotiate the division of a sum of money. The proposer makes an offer on 
how to split the sum. If the other, the responder, accepts the offer, the money is split 
accordingly; if the responder rejects, no-one receives anything. Responders’ rejections of 
positive offers have been interpreted as punishment and as “irrational” behavior according to 
standard economic theory (Camerer, 2003), because getting even a small amount should be 
preferable to getting nothing in case of rejection. This is particularly true for one-shot UGs, in 
which there is no opportunity for future interactions between the players. The one-shot third-
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party punishment (TPP) game measures punishment by unaffected observers (Fehr & 
Fischbacher, 2004) and involves three anonymous persons. Person A allocates resources to 
Person B who can only accept A’s distribution. After observing this allocation, Person C, the 
punisher, can punish A by spending some of his/her own endowment: For every monetary 
unit the punisher spends (e.g., 1 coin), Person A will lose two monetary units (e.g., 2 coins).  
How are punishment decisions contingent on age? In the UG, adult responders 
generally reject/punish offers below 20% of the original resources about half of the time, but 
accept equal offers (Güth & Kocher, 2014). In TPP games, the more equal the allocation, the 
less punishment is administered (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). Fehr and Schmidt (1999) 
suggested that inequity aversion, people’s willingness to give up material payoffs to move in 
the direction of more equal outcomes, was one of the motives underlying adults’ punishment. 
Other factors, such as a violator’s intentions for an unfair allocation or participants’ cultural 
background, have been shown to modulate but not to eliminate the robust association 
between unfairness and punishment (Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2003; Güroğlu et al., 2009; 
Henrich et al., 2006; Sutter, 2007).  
By primary school, children’s punishment is also strongly driven by inequity 
aversion, even more so than adults’ (Blake & McAuliffe, 2011; Castelli, Massaro, Bicchieri, 
Chavez, & Marchetti, 2014; Gummerum & Chu, 2014). In the UG, primary-school children 
reject unequal offers more often than older adolescents and university students (Murnighan & 
Saxon, 1998; Sutter, 2007). Preschool children start to engage in both non-costly (Kenward & 
Östh, 2012; Riedl, Jensen, Call, & Tomasello, 2015) and socially-costly third-party 
punishment of norm violations (i.e., Kenward & Östh, 2015), and six-year-olds use costly 
third-party punishment to sanction inequality (McAuliffe, Jordan, & Warneken, 2015). 
Studies on developmental differences in third-party punishment indicated that older children 
and adolescents were more willing to punish unfair violators than adults (Gummerum, 
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Takezawa, & Keller, 2009; Hao, Yang, & Wang, 2016). Children’s and adolescents’ third-
party punishment was mainly driven by the unfairness of the allocation, and not by their 
understanding of the violator’s intentions or (in)group membership (Gummerum & Chu, 
2014; Jordan, McAuliffe & Warneken, 2014). Thus, for adults, children, and adolescents, 
inequity aversion seems to be a key reason for second- and third-party punishment, but 
adults’ punishment might be driven by additional motives.  
Emotions may be one of these proximate motives underlying costly punishment. 
While the act of punishment can be associated with positive emotions (e.g., satisfaction or 
Schadenfreude, taking delight in another’s misfortune), especially when directed towards 
those who acted unfairly (Jensen, 2010; Steinbeis & Singer, 2013), several studies have 
linked negative emotions to the motivation to punish an unfair actor, mainly among adult 
participants. Adults’ rejections of unfair offers in the UG have been found to be related to an 
increase of neural activity in the anterior insula (associated with feelings of anger and disgust; 
Sanfey et al., 2003), skin conductance responses (a measure of emotional arousal; van’t Wout 
et al., 2006), and self-reported anger (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996). Inducing anger or disgust 
has been associated with increased second-party punishment (Moretti & di Pellegrino, 2010; 
Seip, Van Dijk, & Rotteveel, 2014). Seip et al. (2014) found that self-reported anger 
mediated the relation between the unfairness of the offer and adults’ second-party 
punishment. This suggests that for adults it is the experience of anger and not the perception 
of the unfairness of a distribution that motivates punishment; unequal allocations produce 
anger, which in turn, elicits punishment. 
Self-reported negative emotions are also positively related to adults’ third-party 
punishment (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Lotz, Okimoto, Schlösser, & Fetchenhauer, 2011; 
Wang et al., 2011). Inducing anger significantly increased, while inhibiting anger reduced 
third-party punishment (Gummerum, Van Dillen, Van Dijk, & López-Pérez, 2016; Nelissen 
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& Zeelenberg, 2009). However, Civai, Corradi-Dell’Acqua, Gamer, and Rumiati (2010) had 
adults accept or reject offers as unaffected third parties on behalf of an anonymous recipient 
(i.e., third-party UG). Third parties’ emotional responses were assessed using skin 
conductance (measuring emotional arousal) and self-reported emotions. Participants’ 
rejections of unfair offers were not associated with emotional arousal (i.e., higher skin 
conductance response amplitudes); the association of self-reported emotions to punishment 
was not investigated. Civai et al. (2010) argued that self-relevance underlies the link between 
arousal and punishment. That is, arousal is only associated with punishment when the 
punishers, not a third party, are affected by unfairness.  
In sum, previous research has found mixed results concerning the link between 
punishment and negative emotions in adult samples. This might be due to how negative 
emotions were assessed in the respective studies. Appraisal theories of emotions, for example 
Scherer’s (2009) component process model, suggest that emotion-inducing events are 
appraised on multiple levels of processing. Autonomic physiological reactions (e.g., galvanic 
skin responses) prepare for certain action tendencies, while explicit emotion ratings (i.e., 
“subjective feelings”) represent and integrate the inputs from other levels of emotion-
processing (e.g., physiological symptoms, motor expressions) as well as the response to the 
event. Thus, assessing both physiological responses and explicit emotion ratings can provide 
a fuller picture about the role of emotions in punishment and has the potential to clarify the 
mixed findings reported in the literature. 
As of yet, very few studies have investigated whether negative emotions are 
associated with second- and third-party punishment in children and adolescents, and no study 
has systematically compared developmental differences in the effects of different emotional 
appraisal components on punishment. Van den Bos, Van Dijk, and Crone (2012) showed that 
violations of trustworthiness were associated with self-reported anger in adults, early, and 
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mid-adolescents. Anger was positively correlated with second-party punishment in all age 
groups. Furthermore, adults punished less than adolescents, and these age-related changes in 
punishment were mediated by self-reported anger towards the untrustworthy partner. 
According to the authors, this finding could be due to the more advanced emotion regulation 
skills in adults compared to early adolescents. The current research follows up on these 
findings by investigating the link between negative emotions and punishment of fairness 
violations in 9-year-old children, 13-year-old adolescents, and adults. By 8 years of age, 
children show consistent inequity aversion in their resource allocations and punishment (e.g., 
Blake & McAuliffe, 2011). However, emotion regulation skills still develop from childhood 
to adolescence (López-Pérez, Wilson, Dellaria, & Gummerum, 2016).   
The aims of the present research were threefold: First, to examine whether and how 
negative emotions impacted children’s, adolescents’, and adults’ second-party (Study 1) and 
third-party punishment (Study 2) of unfairness. Second, to assess whether physiological 
responses and explicit emotion ratings were similarly or differentially associated with 
children’s, adolescents, and adults’ punishment. Third, to investigate whether self-relevance 
of the fairness violation underlies the link between negative emotions and punishment in 
different age groups. 
We expected that, among adults, the second-party punishment of unfair offers in the 
UG would be associated with higher galvanic skin responses and more negative emotion 
ratings than acceptance (Hypothesis 1). This positive association between negative emotions 
and second-party punishment might be even stronger in children and adolescents than adults 
(Hypothesis 2), given that emotion regulation skills still develop in these age groups.  
Following Seip et al. (2014), we also expected negative emotions (measured through skin 
conductance and emotion ratings) to mediate the relation between the unfairness of the offer 
and adults’ punishment in the UG (Hypothesis 3). 
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Given previous research (Lotz et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2011), there might also be a 
positive association between self-reported negative emotions and third-party punishment 
(Hypothesis 4). Furthermore, we examined whether negative emotions mediated the link 
between the unfairness of the offer and third-party punishment, similar to Seip at al.’s (2014) 
findings for second-party punishment. Civai et al. (2010) argued that negative emotions are 
associated with punishment when the fairness violation is appraised as being directed at 
oneself as punisher rather than an anonymous other. If such self-relevance does indeed 
underlie the link between negative emotions and punishment, then children’s, adolescents’, 
and adults’ third-party punishment should not be associated with negative emotions 
(Hypothesis 5a). Still, Will, Crone, van den Bos, and Güroğlu (2013) found that third-parties’ 
punishment of social excluders was related to 9- to 22-year-olds’ affective perspective-taking, 
their correct evaluation of the emotional state of the victim. Thus, taking the emotional state 
of the victim into account might make the situation more personally relevant for third-party 
punishers. Consequently, and different to our predictions regarding second-party punishment, 
negative emotions might to a greater degree affect the third-party punishment of unfair 
distributions of adults, who have higher affective perspective-taking skills, than children’s 
and adolescents’ third-party punishment (Hypothesis 5b). 
Study 1: Second-Party Punishment and Emotional Reactions in Children, Adolescents, 
and Adults 
Method 
Participants 
The sample consisted of 117 participants from southern England: 37 children (15 
females, 22 males; MAge = 9.38 years, SD = 1.00 years, age range: 8.75-10.41 years), 40 
adolescents (19 females, 21 males; MAge = 14.37 years, SD = .50 years, age range: 13.75-
14.75 years), and 40 adults (23 females, 17 males; MAge = 29.35 years, SD = 14.62 years; age 
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range: 21.25 – 56.67 years).1 Children and adolescents were recruited from local primary and 
secondary schools, which serve working- and middle-class communities. Only minors who 
received prior parental consent were able to participate in the study. Adults were recruited 
through XXXX University’s paid participant pool. Adults received a show-up fee (£4 per 30 
minutes) and children and adolescents a small gift for their participation. All participants had 
the chance to receive additional rewards as part of the incentive structure of the experiment 
(see below). 
Materials 
 Ultimatum Game (UG): We used a version of the UG employed by Fehr and 
Fischbacher (2004) to study second-party punishment. Using the strategy method to gain a 
comprehensive picture of second-party punishment, participants were allocated to the role of 
Person B and were presented, in counterbalanced order, with seven offers ranging from 0 to 6 
out of 10 points by an anonymous Person A. For each offer, participants had to decide 
whether to accept or reject the offer. If participants accepted the offer, points would be 
allocated accordingly. If participants rejected, neither person would receive anything. We 
decided not to include offers above 6 points as previous literature has found non-significant 
differences in people’s rejection behavior beyond 6-point offers (e.g., Gummerum et al., 
2016).  
Participants were informed that their acceptance/rejection decisions were binding. At 
the end of the experiment one of their decisions regarding a particular offer would be chosen 
randomly and matched to a randomly chosen offer made by an anonymous Person A.  For 
example, if Person A decided to allocate 3 points to Person B and participants in the role of 
Person B had decided to accept 3 out of 10 points, then Person A would be allocated 7 points. 
If participants in the role of Person B had decided to reject this allocation, neither player 
would receive any points. These design choices were made to optimize believability, to 
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ensure participants’ final number of points depended both on their own and Person A’s 
decisions, and to avoid participants regarding their accept/reject decision across the seven 
offers as interconnected. The full set of instructions can be found in Appendix A (Supporting 
Materials). 
Event-related Galvanic Skin Response. Participants’ event-related GSR was 
recorded throughout the experiment, with samples every 200ms (5Hz sample frequency). 
Two electrodes were attached to the index and middle fingers of participants’ non-dominant 
hand. Electrodes were held in place with velcro straps around the fingers to ensure good 
contact. The contact area was approximately 6mm in diameter. The strap tension was 
adjusted to ensure a sensible initial GSR value at the start of the experiment. The electrodes 
were connected between ground and a high impedance input to a LM324 op-amp chain fed 
from a stabilised 5V power supply.  The amplifier output voltage was read by a 
microcontroller ADC (Arduino Leonardo) and communicated to the control programme over 
a high-speed serial link using a custom protocol. Electrodes were attached at the beginning of 
each session, before participants were given instructions, to ensure an adequate warm-up 
phase (ranging between 5 to 12 minutes). 
Participants’ GSR changes in response to the presentation of different offers were 
registered. Changes in the electrical conductance or resistance originate from movement of 
sweat within sweat ducts which may happen spontaneously or due to a presentation of a 
stimulus (i.e., different offers). For each UG, we calculated the difference between 
participants’ GSR responses at T0 (baseline before the offer was made) and at T1 (prior to the 
participant’s decision, Figure 1). A positive score indicates an increase in GSR 
response/emotional arousal from T0 to T1, a negative score a decrease. Between each UG, 
there was a 5 second inter-trial interval. 
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Emotional Valence Ratings. After each offer, participants indicated their emotional 
valence on a rating scale ranging from 1 = very unhappy/displeased with the offer to 7 = very 
pleased/happy with the offer (Civai et al., 2010). 
Procedure 
 Ethical approval was granted by XXXX University’s Ethics Committee. Up to five 
adult participants were tested simultaneously in the laboratories of XXXX University and 
were seated at computer terminals in separate cubicles. Two children or adolescents were 
tested simultaneously at two laptop computers in a quiet room in their schools during class 
time. After signing the consent form (adults) or providing verbal assent (minors), participants 
were administered hand sanitizer, and two electrodes were attached to the index and middle 
fingers of their non-dominant hand to register their galvanic skin response (GSR).  
Participants’ skin conductance baseline was registered while they received instructions. GSRs 
were recorded continuously throughout the experiment. 
Afterwards, participants received instructions for the UG. To verify task 
comprehension, participants completed two sets of quiz questions: For two example 
distributions they had to calculate the correct payoffs for Persons A and B depending on 
whether Person B accepted or rejected Person A’s allocation. Incorrect answers received an 
automatic prompt; after three prompts participants received further instructions. Our 
exclusion rule was that those who failed two sets of quiz questions were removed from the 
main analyses. All participants answered at least one of the two sets of quiz questions 
correctly; no-one was removed from the subsequent analyses. 
Participants were told that in addition to the show-up fee, the points distributed in one 
randomly chosen game would be converted into raffle tickets with the chance to win one (or 
more) of 20 £20 amazon vouchers (adults) or a funky USB drive of their choice (minors). To 
encourage participants to maximize personal preferences, it was pointed out that the more 
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points/raffle tickets they accrued, the higher their winning chances. Participants were told that 
their final points payoffs were determined by matching one of their randomly selected 
accept/reject decisions as Person B with the decision of an anonymous Person A.  
 Participants then made seven UG decisions as Person B. Participants first viewed, for 
15 seconds, the UG offer before deciding as to whether to accept or reject.  After the 
decision, participants were presented (for 5 seconds) with the distribution again and asked 
how they felt when receiving the offer. The timeline for each UG is presented in Figure 1. 
After participants made seven UG decisions as Person B, they made one decision as Person 
A.2 Finally, participants were thanked and debriefed. After all data were collected, the 
winning raffle ticket holders were determined and rewards were allocated.  
Statistical Analyses  
Punishment decisions, GSRs and emotional reactions were analyzed in RStudio 
statistical software (version 1.0.153) using package lme4 (Bates, Maechler, & Bolker, 2012). 
Generalized Linear Mixed Models (GLMM) were conducted to analyze punishment decisions 
with the fixed effects Age Group (children, adolescents, adults) and Offer (Offers of  0, 1,…6 
out of 10 points) and Age Group x Offer, and the random intercepts of Subject Identities and 
Offer. Linear mixed-effects models (LMM) were conducted on participants’ GSRs and 
emotional reactions, respectively. Decision (reject, accept), Offer (0, 1,…6 out of 10 points), 
Age Group (children, adolescents, adults), and the interactions of Decision x Age Group and 
Decision x Offer were fit as fixed effects, Subject Identities and Offer as random intercepts. 
P-values were obtained using R package lmerTest (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 
2017).  
Moderated mediation analyses were run using the PROCESS v3.3 macro (Hayes, 
2017) in SPSS 24 testing (1) whether the mediation of GSR/emotion ratings in the link 
between UG offer and punishment were moderated by age group and (2) whether age group 
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moderated the link between GSRs and punishment rates. Following Hayes and Montoya 
(2017), since age group was a multicategorical variable, we used sequential coding with 
children as the baseline category (see Table S3, Supporting Materials). A statistical diagram 
of the tested models can be found in Figure S1 (Supporting Materials). Estimates were based 
on 10,000 bootstraps. For mediation to occur, the 95% confidence interval (CI) should not 
include the value of zero (Hayes, 2017). 
Results 
Second-party Punishment 
The main effect of Offer emerged as significant predictor; the interaction between 
Offer x Age Group was marginally significant (Table 1). The lower the offer, the more likely 
it was to be rejected. Adolescents tended to reject offers of 3 and 4 points more often than 
adults (Figure 2).   
Second-party Punishment and Emotional Reactions 
Concerning GSR, Decision, Age Group, and the interaction of Decision x Age Group 
emerged as significant predictors (Table 2). Participants’ GSRs were more positive when 
they rejected (M = .20, SD = .62) than when they accepted offers (M = -.10, SD = .65). 
Children showed more positive GSRs than adolescents and adults, particularly when rejecting 
offers (Figure 3).  
Concerning emotion ratings, Decision and Offer emerged as significant predictors 
(Table 2). Across ages, participants were happier when they accepted (M = 4.42, SD = 1.67) 
rather than rejected offers (M = 2.47, SD = 1.61). Participants were more pleased with higher 
than with lower offers (Figure 4). 
GSRs and emotion ratings were only significantly correlated when the proposer 
offered zero points, r(114) = -.22, p = .02, but not when s/he offered 1 to 6 points, rs(114) = -
.13 - .06, ps = .15 - .84. 
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Mediation of GSR in the Link between Offer and Punishment Moderated by Age 
 The direct effect of UG offer on punishment was significant across age groups, b = 
.75, SE = .06, CI [.64, .86]. The higher the offer by Person A, the less the offer was punished. 
GSR mediated the link between UG offer and punishment in adults, b = .03, SE = .02, CI 
[.01, .09], but not children, b = .05, SE = .03, CI [-.01, .13] or adolescents, b = -.02, SE = .02, 
CI [-.07, .02]. The index of moderated mediation indicated that this mediation effect was 
stronger in adults than children and adolescents, CI[.01, .13], and stronger in adolescents than 
children, CI[-.16, -.01]. Table S4 (Supporting Materials) shows the full regression 
coefficients.  
Mediation of Emotion Ratings in the Link between Offer and Punishment Moderated 
by Age 
The direct effect of UG offer on punishment was significant across age groups, b = 
.51, SE = .06, CI [.39, .62]. Emotion ratings mediated the relation between UG offer and 
punishment for children, b = .16, SE = .05, CI [.07, .27], adolescents, b = .33, SE = .07, CI 
[.21, .48], and adults, b = .27, SE = .08, CI [.13, .45]. The index of moderated mediation 
indicated that there was a stronger mediation effect in adolescents and adults than children, 
CI [.02, .34], but no difference in mediation between adolescents and adults, CI [-.26, .14] 
(see Table S5, Supporting Materials, for regression coefficients). 
Discussion 
Whereas previous research has shown that the inequality of the offer by Person A 
significantly affected second-party punishment in different age groups (Falk et al., 2003; 
Gummerum & Chu, 2014; Sutter, 2007), Study 1 contributed new insights on the role of 
emotions for the second-party punishment of children, adolescents, and adults.  Across these 
age groups, second-party punishment was associated with higher arousal (more positive 
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GSR) and more negative emotion ratings (Civai et al., 2010; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996; 
van’t Wout et al., 2006), but children generally displayed more positive GSRs than 
adolescents and adults. This may be due to how the different age groups regulated their initial 
emotional responses to the proposer’s offer, as previous research has shown that children 
encounter more difficulties in regulating their own emotions compared to adolescents and 
adults (e.g., Eisenberg, 2000). 
Importantly, the moderated mediation analyses allowed us to investigate whether 
second-party punishment is driven by the experience of negative emotion, rather than the 
unfairness of the offer. Seip et al. (2014) showed that explicit emotion ratings mediated the 
link between offers and punishment in adults, and Study 1 extended these findings to children 
and adolescents using appropriately adjusted methods. Both the experience of negative 
emotions and the perception of unfairness of the offer motivated second-party punishment 
across age groups, partly supporting Hypothesis 3. However, GSRs only mediated the link 
between offers and punishment in adults, not children and adolescents.  
The difference between the effects of GSR versus emotion ratings on second-party 
punishment could be due to the timing of the two emotion indices. GSR was assessed online, 
while participants made decisions, whereas emotion ratings were provided after participants 
had made their punishment decisions. Yet, this does not explain as to why GSR served as a 
mediator of the effect of offer on punishment in adults, but not children and adolescents. 
Alternatively, GSRs (i.e., autonomic and automatic physiological reactions) and explicit 
emotion ratings (i.e., “subjective feelings”) represent different levels and stages of processing 
in the appraisal of emotion-inducing events (Scherer, 2009). GSRs are linked to more generic 
salience appraisals and emotion ratings represent a summary of inputs from other levels of 
processing. There is relatively little research that explicitly tests the interplay between these 
different levels of processing of emotion-inducing events and their association with 
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subsequent behavior across development. Dys and Malti (2016) investigated children’s and 
adolescents’ automatic versus controlled, self-reported emotional responses to moral 
transgressions. The authors suggested that automatic emotional responses are based on 
repeated associations between a moral transgression and its explicit emotional appraisal. 
Thus, children’s explicit and repeated emotional evaluations of a transgression turn into 
automatic emotional responses to that transgression that may reflect their internalization of 
moral norms. Applying this interpretation to Study 1’s findings, among adults, repeated 
explicit negative evaluations of unfair allocations might have internalized and “automatized” 
this emotional response. Consequently, in adults automatic physiological (i.e., GSR) and 
explicit emotional reactions are aligned, and in concert drive second-party punishment. 
Adolescents and particularly children might not have automatized this emotional response to 
transgressions (as represented by GSRs). They might still rely on controlled and explicit 
emotional appraisal processes to prepare and enact action tendencies to appropriately deal 
with the fairness transgression. 
Study 2: Third-party Punishment and Emotional Reactions in Children, 
Adolescents, and Adults  
This study extended Study 1’s findings to a third-party setting to examine self-
relevance in the link between negative emotions and punishment, as proposed by Civai et al. 
(2010). It also investigated age differences in this relation, particularly whether the third-
party punishment of adults, who have higher perspective-taking skills, is affected by negative 
emotions compared to children’s and adolescents’ third-party punishment. 
Method 
Participants 
A new sample of 119 participants was recruited from the same populations as in 
Study 1: 40 children (17 females, 23 males; MAge = 9.25 years, SD = 1.64 years, age range: 
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8.25-10.33 years), 39 adolescents (21 females, 18 males; MAge = 13.90 years, SD = .50 years, 
age range: 12.75-14.25 years), and 40 adults (29 females, 11 males; MAge = 24.42 years, SD = 
10.41 years, age range: 20.67 – 60.33 years). Participants received the same compensation as 
in Study 1.  
Materials 
 Third-party punishment (TPP) game (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). All participants 
were allocated to the role of the punisher (Person C). They were presented, in 
counterbalanced order, with seven distributions between anonymous Persons A and B. Person 
A allocated 0 to 6 out of 10 points to Person B, respectively; Person B could only accept A’s 
allocation. For each distribution, participants, the punishers, were allocated 5 points. They 
had to decide whether to pay any points from this 5-point endowment to punish Person A. 
For every point the punisher paid, 2 points were taken away from A’s payoff. Person B’s 
payoff was not affected. Thus, participants made 7 punishment decisions altogether. 
Participants were informed that their punishment decisions were binding. At the end 
of the experiment, one of their punishments of a particular allocation by Person A would be 
chosen randomly and matched to a randomly chosen allocation decision made by an 
anonymous Person A.2  For example, if Person A had decided to allocate 3 points to Person B 
and participants in the role of Person C decided to punish A by paying 1 of their 5 points, 
then Person A would be allocated 5 (7-2) points, Person B 3 points, and Person C 4 (5-1) 
points. As in Study 1, participants were told that the more points they accrued, the higher 
their chances of winning one of the amazon vouchers (adults) or USB sticks of their choice 
(children and adolescents). 
Event-related Galvanic Skin Response and Emotion Ratings were assessed in the 
same way as in Study 1. 
Procedure 
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 The procedure was identical to the one in Study 1 except that participants engaged in 
seven third-party punishment decisions in a TPP game rather than second party punishment 
decisions.  
Statistical Analyses 
 The data analytic approach was the same as in Study 1. 
Results 
Three adults did not answer two sets of quiz questions correctly and were thus 
removed from the analysis (final N = 116).   
Third-party Punishment 
A LMM revealed Offer and Offer x Age Group as significant predictors (Table 1). 
The lower the offer by Person A, the more participants punished. Adults punished low offers 
of 0 to 2 points more, but punished higher offers of 4 to 6 points less than children and 
adolescents (Figure 5).  
Third-party Punishment and Emotional Reactions 
Concerning GSR, the predicted model did not produce any significant main or 
interaction effects (Table 3).3 Concerning emotion ratings, the predicted model produced the 
effects of Offer and Punishment x Age Group (Table 3). The more participants punished with 
the offer, the more displeased they felt, r(811) = .44, p < .01, but this relation was stronger 
among adults (r(258) = .60, p < .01) than among children (r(279) = .14, p = .02) or 
adolescents (r(272) = .17, p =.005).3 Across offers, GSRs and emotion ratings did not 
correlate significantly with each other, rs(114 - 115) = -.13 - .10, ps = .18 - .90. 
Mediation of GSR in the Link between Offer and Punishment Moderated by Age 
The direct effect of offer on punishment was significant across age groups, b = -.43, 
SE = .03, CI [-.48, -.38]. The higher the offer by Person A to Person B, the less the offer was 
punished by Person C.  GSR did not mediate the link between TPP offer and punishment in 
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either age group (children: b = -.01, SE = .01, CI [-.02, .01]; adolescents: b = -.001, SE = 
.004, CI [-.01, .01]; adults: b = -.004, SE = .01, CI [-.02, .001]. This mediation effect did not 
differ between children, adolescents, and adults (Table S7, Supporting Materials). 
Mediation of Emotion Ratings in the Link between Offer and Punishment Moderated 
by Age  
The direct effect of TPP offer on punishment was significant across age groups, b = -
.40, SE = .03, CI [-.45, -.34]. Emotion ratings mediated the relation between offer and 
punishment for adults, b = -.13, SE = .03, CI [-.19, .08], but not adolescents, b = .01, SE = 
.02, CI [-.03, .05], or children, b = .004, SE = .02, CI [-.03, .04]. The index of moderated 
mediation indicated that there was a stronger mediation effect in adults than children and 
adolescents, CI [-.20, -.08], but no difference in mediation between children versus 
adolescents and adults, CI [-.05, .06] (Table S8, Supporting Materials). 
Discussion 
Study 2 indicates that, similar to second-party punishment, costly third-party 
punishment seems to be driven by the inequality of the distribution between Persons A and B 
as more selfish distributions by Person A received more punishment than equal offers in all 
age groups (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Gummerum & Chu, 2014). It seems, however, that 
adults’ third-party punishment is more proportional to the inequality of Person A’s allocation 
than the punishment by children and adolescents: Adults’ third-party punishment seemed to 
be more calibrated to the amount offered by Person A, while the amount children and 
adolescents invested to punish was more similar across the range of offers. These findings 
mirror research on the development of distributive justice concepts. For example, Hook and 
Cook (1979) suggested that proportionality hardly plays a role in third-parties’ allocations of 
rewards until early adolescence. They found that using proportionality in their allocations 
was associated with children’s and adolescents’ logico-mathematical development. Thus, 
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cognitive abilities (e.g., understanding of proportionality) might partly underlie these age 
effects in third-party punishment. Measures of such cognitive abilities could be included in 
future studies investigating the development of third-party punishment. 
Contrary to Study 1, GSR was not associated with third-party punishment and did not 
mediate the link between offer and third-party punishment in either age group. This supports 
Civai et al.’s (2010) argument that emotional arousal is only associated with punishment of 
unfairness when unfairness is self-relevant. Third-party punishment was associated with more 
negative emotion ratings, particularly among adults (see Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Lotz et 
al., 2011). Self-reported negative emotions only mediated the relation between offers and 
punishment in adults.  
As we have contended in the Discussion of Study 1, these findings highlight the 
differential role of automatic and controlled emotional appraisal processes in children’s, 
adolescents’, and adults’ punishment. Automatic emotional appraisals of unfairness 
(measured through GSR) are only associated with punishment, if unfairness affects the 
punisher directly, as in the UG, but not when the third-party punisher is an unaffected 
bystander (Civai et al., 2010). Thus, self-relevance might be one criterion that elicits 
automatic appraisal processes in unfairness situations (see Scherer, 2009). In situations where 
unfairness does not affect the self, more controlled processes, both explicit emotional 
appraisals and other social-cognitive processes (e.g., affective perspective-taking), might be 
necessary to bridge this self-relevance gap for third parties to engage in costly punishment. In 
sum, while third parties might have a negative emotional reaction to an unfair allocation, 
negative emotions only motivate costly punishment when there is some degree of self-
relevance. Affective perspective-taking with the victim might fill this “self-relevance gap” in 
third-party situations (Will et al., 2013). Supporting this notion, our results indicate that 
emotion ratings only served as mediators between unfair offers and third-party punishment in 
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adults, who have higher affective perspective-taking than children and adolescents. This 
association between emotional reactions, affective perspective-taking, and third-party 
punishment should be investigated more directly in future studies. 
General Discussion 
 This research investigated how negative emotional responses to unfairness influence 
children’s, adolescents’, and adults’ second- and third-party punishment. We found that self-
relevance of the fairness violation (i.e., punishment in second- vs. third-party situations), age, 
and the emotional appraisal component measured (i.e., GSR vs. emotion ratings) mattered for 
explaining the relation between emotions and punishment. Yet, the unfairness of the offer 
strongly influenced second- and third-party punishment in all age groups, above and beyond 
the effect of negative emotions (see also McAuliffe & Dunham, 2017). 
The idea that negative emotions, such as anger, frustration, or disgust, underlie 
people’s punitive actions is anchored in both theoretical and empirical research (e.g., Haidt, 
2003; Lotz et al., 2011; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996; van’t Wout et al., 2006). Our research 
indicates that different components of the emotional-appraisal process are differentially 
related to punishment across ages and contexts. Following Scherer’s (2009) component 
process model, we assessed GSR as an indicator of autonomic physiological emotional 
reactions and explicit emotion ratings as an indicator of the subjective feelings component. 
Following Dys and Malti’s (2016) interpretation, automatic emotional reactions reflect 
internalization of moral standards (e.g., to distribute resources equally) and are formed after 
repeatedly linking explicit emotional appraisals to transgressions. These findings are relevant 
for appraisal theories of emotions, which have been rarely studied in a developmental 
context. Dys and Malti’s (2016) and our findings give some indication as to when and why 
certain emotion components might affect children’s, adolescents’, and adults’ emotional 
appraisals of and behavioral reactions to moral transgressions specifically. Future research 
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should continue to explicitly test the predictions of emotion theories (e.g., the component 
process model, Scherer, 2009) across development. 
There has been an ongoing debate in moral psychology as to whether people’s moral 
judgments and behaviors are driven by deliberate (e.g., moral reasoning) or automatic 
processes (e.g., heuristics, emotions; Cushman, 2013; Haidt, 2001). Our conclusion would be 
that both are relevant. Repeated and consistent explicit (emotional) evaluations of morally-
relevant situations may eventually become internalized and encapsulated as automatic 
responses (Dys & Malti, 2016). While this interpretation might run counter to the stereotype 
that, with development, people rely more on controlled and “rational” processes in their 
decision-making, such a developmental shift, from children using more deliberate to adults 
relying on more automatic and heuristic processes, has been reported in other domains, such 
as risky decisions (e.g., Rivers, Reyna, & Mills, 2008). 
Automatic emotional reactions influence adults’ costly punishment, but only in 
situations where unfairness is self-relevant (i.e., in the UG). In third-party situations, where 
unfairness is not aimed at the punisher, even adults might have to rely on controlled and 
deliberate processes, such as explicit emotional reactions, to enact costly punishment of 
unfairness. Similarly, Dys and Malti (2016) suggest that automatic emotional reactions are 
insensitive to contextual variables (e.g., the type of transgression) and that differentiating 
between contextual cues and acting adaptively might require explicit emotional evaluations 
of the situation. This interpretation bears some similarity to previous developmental research 
on inequity aversion and (third-party) punishment. While the inequality of an allocation was a 
major determinant of punishment in children, adolescents, and adults (Castelli et al., 2014; 
Gummerum & Chu, 2014; McAuliffe et al., 2015), adults consider additional information 
(e.g., intentions) when pondering how to react to unfairness (Gummerum & Chu, 2014; 
Güroğlu, et al., 2009; Radke, Güroğlu, & de Bruijn, 2012). This model fits the findings of the 
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current studies well: Independent of age, second- and third-party punishment appear to be 
based on inequity aversion, but only among adults is punishment consistently associated with 
explicit emotional appraisals. Doing so might require higher perspective-taking, particularly 
in third-party punishers, an ability that emerges in mid-adolescence but that even adults have 
been found to struggle with (Will et al., 2013).  
The current studies have a number of limitations, which should be addressed in future 
research. First, our findings suggest that self-relevance matters for costly punishment, but that 
developing socio-cognitive abilities (e.g., perspective-taking, empathic concern) might help 
in bridging the “self-relevance gap”. Yet, our studies did not measure these abilities directly, 
a lacuna that future studies should attend to.  Similarly, our interpretation of how automatic 
and explicit emotional appraisal processes affect moral decisions across development and 
whether and how explicit emotional appraisals become internalized and automatic should be 
tested more directly in future research and potentially in other decision domains. Finally, 
while economic games, such as the ultimatum and third-party punishment game, allow for 
studying punishment of fairness violations across age groups, they nevertheless represent 
rather abstract punishment situations. Thus, future research might explore the role of 
emotions and social-cognitive abilities when children, adolescents, and adults reason and 
decide about punishment as a direct or indirect victim of a real-life violation (e.g., in 
instances of domestic abuse or bullying). Overall, continuing to examine the psychological 
factors that affect costly punishment in children, adolescents and adults can have important 
theoretical and applied implications.  
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Footnotes 
1 The sample sizes for Studies 1 and 2 were determined a priori by power analysis using the 
program Gpower (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). Previous research found that the 
effect of negative emotions (arousal or emotion ratings) on punishment ranged between d = 
.75 and .89.  Thus, at least 27 participants per age group would be needed to detect an effect 
with power = .8 at a significance level of α = .05. 
2 Participants’ decisions as Person A were only collected to match them to the decision of one 
randomly selected Person B to determine B’s final number of points. Since they are not the 
focus of the current paper, results regarding decisions of Persons A’s decisions can be found 
in Tables S1 and S2 (Supporting Information). 
3 An LMM with the fixed effects Binary Punishment (0 = “0 points invested for punishment”; 
1 = ”1 to 5 points invested for punishment”), Offer, Age Group, Binary Punishment x Age 
Group, and Binary Punishment x Offer and Subject ID and Offer as random intercepts 
revealed no significant main or interaction effects (Table S6, Supporting Materials).  An 
LMM, containing the fixed effects Binary Punishment (0 = “0 points invested for 
punishment; 1 = ”1 to 5 points invested for punishment”), Offer, Age Group, Binary 
Punishment x Age Group, and Binary Punishment x Offer and Subject ID and Offer as the 
random intercepts, produced a significant main effect of Offer and a marginally significant 
effect of Punishment x Age Group (Table S6, Supporting Materials).   
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Table 1 
Estimates (Standard Errors) of Fixed Effects and Goodness-of-Fit Statistics of the Predicted 
Models Predicting Participants’ Ultimatum Game Decisions (Reject, Accept) and Third-party 
punishment. 
 Ultimatum Game decision  Third-party punishment 
   Intercept 
   Age group 
   Offer 
   Age group x Offer 
-2.34 (.42)** 
-.02 (.26) 
.74 (.11)** 
.14 (.07)† 
3.04 (.15)** 
.15 (.12) 
-.33 (.03)** 
-.11 (.03)** 
BIC 
Log Likelihood 
Number of observations 
Variance: ID 
Variance: Offer 
830.93 
-395.39 
805 
1.15 
.12 
2844.84 
-1398.97 
812 
.42 
.00 
† p < .10; ** p < .01 
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Table 2 
Study 1: Estimates (Standard Errors) of Fixed Effects and Goodness-of-Fit Statistics of the 
Predicted Models Predicting Participants’ Galvanic Skin Responses and Emotion Ratings in 
the Ultimatum Game. 
 Galvanic Skin Responses Emotion Ratings 
   Intercept 
   Decision 
   Age group 
   Offer 
   Decision x Offer 
   Decision x Age group 
.30 (.07)** 
-.59 (.11)** 
-.15 (.04)** 
.02 (.02) 
.02 (.03) 
.16 (.06)** 
1.74 (.22) 
.50 (.25)* 
-.03 (.12) 
.45 (.06)** 
.10 (.06) 
-.07 (.12) 
BIC 
Log Likelihood 
Number of observations 
Variance: ID 
Variance: Offer 
1614.36 
-777.06 
805 
.39 
.17 
2820.16 
-1379.97 
805 
.57 
.04 
* p < .05; ** p < .01 
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Table 3 
Study 2: Estimates (Standard Errors) of Fixed Effects and Goodness-of-Fit Statistics of the 
Predicted Models Predicting Participants’ Galvanic Skin Responses and Emotion Ratings in 
the Third-party Punishment Game. 
 Galvanic Skin Responses Emotion ratings 
   Intercept 
   Age group 
   Offer 
   Punishment 
   Punishment x Offer 
   Punishment x Age group 
1.11 (1.17) 
-.23 (.63) 
-.01 (.23) 
-.13 (.36) 
.01 (.09) 
.05 (.23) 
3.07 (.25)** 
-.08 (.14) 
.37 (.05)** 
.01 (.07) 
-.02 (.02) 
-.11 (.04)** 
BIC 
Log Likelihood 
Number of observations 
Variance: ID 
Variance: Offer 
5829.76 
-2884.73 
812 
7.68 
.01 
3112.57 
-1526.14 
812 
.71 
.01 
** p < .01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
